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ABSTRACT 
As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly expanded its economic 
influence in the Asia-Pacific region, Southeast Asia has specifically become one of the 
PRC’s regional focus areas. The PRC has emphasized increasing political relationships 
and economic partnerships with Southeast Asian countries. Currently, the U.S. 
government lacks a quantitative assessment that measures the PRC’s influence in the 
region by assessing the behaviors of the countries in Southeast Asia. This investigation 
seeks to identify if the PRC’s economic investment in Southeast Asia is influencing 
measurable behavior. To analyze the PRC’s influence, this research uses votes from the 
United Nations General Assembly and economic investment data to assess the 
relationship between the behaviors of Southeast Asian countries and the PRC’s economic 
investment. The quantitative analysis of these factors finds that alignment with the PRC 
is stronger in poor countries when the trade balance is in the PRC’s favor; however, 
under the same condition in richer countries, alignment with the PRC declines. 
Additionally, in the absence of aid (including loans and grants), the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) has a negative effect; however, when there is high investment in both the 
BRI and aid, there is a strong alignment with the PRC.
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The U.S. National Defense Strategy acknowledges the efforts of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) to utilize its growing economic power and military modernization 
to gain hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region.1 This signifies potential security challenges 
for the United States. As the PRC has shifted from indirect to direct competition with the 
United States, it is clear that the PRC is interested in changing the status quo of the 
international order to one that is more suitable for its authoritarian government. The 
relationship between the United States and the PRC has further deteriorated from the PRC’s 
cyber-attacks and intellectual property theft against the United States, to a public trade war 
and commercial and political competition across the globe. The current state of the 
relationship between these two powers has influenced scholarly, political and military 
interest in the re-emergence of great power competition and the employment of national 
power.  
The PRC achieving regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region is the most 
immediate concern and has the potential to disrupt U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. For 
this reason, I examined what the measurable behavior of Southeast Asian countries 
indicates about the influence of the PRC within the region. 
B. PROBLEM 
The PRC has shown significant interests in Southeast Asia and has increased its 
economic partnerships there through trade and economic investment. Although economic 
investment is beneficial, several countries within the region have displayed mixed 
responses to the PRC’s growing influence. The majority express wariness of the PRC 
converting economic power to political power and forcing them to make undesirable 
concessions. If this conversion of power were to materialize, it could disrupt key security 
 
1 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America (Washington, D.C: Department of Defense, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/
pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
xvi 
alliances, partnerships and collaboration efforts that the United States shares with countries 
in Southeast Asia. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
To identify if the economic influence of the PRC is influencing the behaviors of 
Southeast Asian countries, I analyzed their United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
voting alignment and the primary mechanisms of regional economic investment. Through 
the investigation of these factors I sought to answer the question: What does a quantitative 
analysis of the behaviors of Southeast Asian countries indicate about the influence of the 
PRC’s economic investment within the region? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
To investigate this question, I developed three hypotheses for quantitative 
assessment. A regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between the 
PRC’s economic investment in Southeast Asia and the measurable behavior of Southeast 
Asian countries. Utilizing UNGA votes as the dependent variable, a mathematical model 
was constructed that included variables that have the potential to influence the behavior of 
Southeast Asian countries. The independent variables included: Trade Total, Trade 
Balance, BRI Investment, Foreign Direct Investment, and Aid (including loans and grants); 
and the control variables are Polity and GDP. 
E. SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
The statistical analysis of these two relationships finds that vote alignment with the 
PRC is stronger in poor countries when the trade balance is in the PRC’s favor; however, 
in richer countries the PRC’s influence declines. Additionally, in the absence of Aid, Loans 
and Grants, the Belt and Road Initiative has a negative effect; however, when there is high 
investment in both the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Aid, Loans and Grants, there is 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has gained more economic and political 
influence, the competition between the PRC and the United States has increased to a global 
scale. The primary area of competition has been in the Indo-Pacific region. The United 
States National Defense Strategy highlights the PRC’s efforts to utilize its growing 
economic power and military modernization to gain hegemony in this region, which 
identifies potential security challenges for the United States.1 Within the Indo-Pacific 
region, the PRC has shown significant interests in Southeast Asia and become the largest 
trading partner of the majority of the countries in the region, with trade totaling $514.8 
billion in 2017.2 In addition to expanding its trade relations with these countries, the PRC 
has increasingly focused on enhancing security cooperation and establishing economic 
partnerships with countries in Southeast Asia.  
As the relationship between the PRC and the United States has deteriorated and 
shifted from indirect to direct competition, it is clear that the PRC is interested in changing 
the regional power balance to one that is more suitable for its authoritarian government. 
The PRC has leveraged its economic power as the key instrument to expand its influence 
and to challenge the regional dominance of the United States. A significant expansion of 
PRC influence within Southeast Asia could disrupt key security alliances, partnerships and 
collaboration efforts that the United States shares with countries in Southeast Asia. If 
Michael Pillsbury’s overall assertion in The Hundred Year Marathon is correct, perhaps a 
regional shift in power is one strategic goal in the PRC’s master plan to unseat the United 
States as the global superpower.3 This investigation sought to utilize quantitative methods 
to  assess the validity of the PRC’s grand plan as depicted by Pillsbury. Thus, in order to 
 
1 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America (Washington, D.C: Department of Defense, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/
pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
2 Tuan Yuen Kong, “The Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia and Responses from ASEAN 
Countries,” China: An International Journal 17, no. 4 (November 2019): 24–33. 
3 Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the 
Global Superpower (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2015). 
2 
determine whether the economic power of the PRC is influencing the behaviors of 
Southeast Asian countries, a quantitative study was conducted to analyze their United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting alignment and the PRC’s primary mechanisms 
of economic investment in Southeast Asia.  
A. THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE  
One of the PRC’s primary mechanisms to establish partnerships in the region is to 
invest in large-scale infrastructure projects under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), shown 
in Figure 1. The BRI is one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects in history. It is an 
expansive infrastructure and trade development program that will connect Asia with Africa 
and Europe via land and sea corridors. The infrastructure projects will traverse the ancient 
Silk Road and connect some of the most anticipated economic development zones in the 
world.4 The BRI is composed of two signature initiatives: the Silk Road Economic Belt 
(SREB) and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The SREB is land-based and will link the 
underdeveloped areas of the PRC to Central Asia and Europe.5 The MSR will link the 
southern regions of the PRC to Southeast Asia via ports and railways.6 The PRC has been 
fairly successful in garnering support for the initiative; since 2013 the BRI has expanded 
to include over 60 member countries, with a total cost to the PRC of approximately $200 
billion.7 
 
4 Yong Wang, “Offensive for Defensive: The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s New Grand 
Strategy,” The Pacific Review 29, no. 3 (May 26, 2016): 455–63, https://doi.org/10.1080/
09512748.2016.1154690. 
5 Kong, “The Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia.” 
6 Peter Cai, “Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Lowy Institute, March 22, 2017, 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-belt-and-road-initiative. 
7 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on 




Figure 1. Belt and Road Initiative8 
The economic benefits of the BRI are appealing to countries along the BRI transport 
corridor because the initiative could improve trade, decrease poverty in participating 
nations, and create opportunities for foreign investment, which are often limited due to 
extended shipping periods.9 Also, the construction of roads and transport links is expected 
to provide greater access to global markets, and expanded exports among participating 
countries. It is estimated that there will be significant real income gains in three Southeast 
Asian economies: Thailand (8.2 percent), Malaysia (7.7 percent) and Cambodia (5.0 
 
8 Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “The Belt and Road Initiative in 
the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape,” in OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2018 
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018), 11, https://doi.org/10.1787/bus_fin_out-2018-6-en. 
9 “Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors,” World Bank, accessed 
March 13, 2020, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/publication/belt-and-road-
economics-opportunities-and-risks-of-transport-corridors. 
4 
percent).10 The World Bank has also assessed that “the increased trade and investment will 
boost GDP and welfare, thus reducing poverty in the region.”11 It also estimates that 7.6 
million people worldwide could be raised from extreme poverty if the BRI is completed.12 
Additionally, the large infrastructure and transport projects offer long-term development 
prospects that many participating countries are unable to provide alone. According to Asian 
Development Bank calculations, the Southeast Asia region will require approximately $1.7 
trillion in infrastructure investments between 2016 to 2030.13  
Although the infrastructure upgrades and financial support to execute the projects 
are greatly needed throughout the region, the BRI has received mixed responses from 
Southeast Asian countries.14 For example, the BRI provides competition with Japanese 
companies for infrastructure projects, which countries such as Laos and Cambodia 
welcome as a potential benefit to their economies. In contrast, the Philippines and 
Indonesia are more apprehensive about the overall competition of major powers in the 
region, especially between the PRC and the United States.15 The majority of Southeast 
Asian countries have agreed to participate in BRI and continue to forge economic ties with 
the PRC; however, the countries are wary of the PRC converting economic influence into 
political power and forcing them to make undesirable concessions. Additionally, the PRC’s 
economic charm offensive and aggressive South China Sea actions are often viewed as 
indications of its revisionist ambition and the expectation that Southeast Asian states 
should tolerate its behavior.16 This has influenced some Southeast Asian countries to 
deepen ties with multiple major powers in order to hedge against the potential threat from 
 
10 World Bank, 57. 
11 World Bank, 45. 
12 World Bank, 59. 
13 Kong, “The Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia,” 28. 
14 Kong, “The Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia”; Hong Zhao, “China–Japan Compete for 
Infrastructure Investment in Southeast Asia: Geopolitical Rivalry or Healthy Competition?,” Journal of 
Contemporary China 28, no. 118 (July 4, 2019): 558–74, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1557946. 
15 Zhao, “China–Japan Compete for Infrastructure Investment,” 559. 
16 Gong Xue, “The Belt & Road Initiative and China’s Influence in Southeast Asia,” The Pacific 
Review 32, no. 4 (July 4, 2019): 635–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2018.1513950. 
5 
a more powerful PRC in the future.17 Furthermore, some nations in the region have 
expressed a preference for U.S. dominance as the United States primarily employs soft 
power and diplomatic cooperation.18  
It is widely accepted that the PRC’s motivations for implementing the BRI are both 
economic and geopolitical. The BRI includes five areas of cooperation: policy dialogue, 
infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial support and people-to-people 
exchange.19 The BRI provides the PRC not only an avenue for economic growth, but also 
an opportunity to impact the international economic system by challenging the Western-
influenced World Bank and International Monetary Fund by financing projects through the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).20 The AIIB also rivals the Asian 
Development Bank, which is led by Japan and strongly supported by the United States.21 
The PRC’s ability to expand its economic influence through the AIIB challenges the 
current international economic system, which is dominated by the United States and the 
U.S. dollar. It is in the PRC’s interest to influence the international economic systems to 
align them with its own strategic objectives, which are often in direct competition with the 
United States. Garnering more influence in international economic systems will enable the 
PRC to implement changes that facilitate its rise. 
 
 
17 Jürgen Haacke, “The Concept of Hedging and Its Application to Southeast Asia: A Critique and a 
Proposal for a Modified Conceptual and Methodological Framework,” International Relations of the Asia-
Pacific 19, no. 3 (September 1, 2019): 375–417, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz010; Ann Marie Murphy, 
“Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages,” 
Asian Security 13, no. 3 (September 2, 2017): 165–82, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2017.1354566. 
18 Xue, “The Belt & Road Initiative.” 
19 Yiping Huang, “Understanding China’s Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, Framework and 
Assessment,” China Economic Review, no. 40 (2016): 314–21. 
20 Huang. 
21 David B. H. (ed) Denoon, Marvin Ott, and Chu Shulong, China, The United States, and the Future 
of Southeast Asia: U.S.-China Relations, vol. II (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2017), 
http://muse.jhu.edu/book/56534/. 
6 
B. GEOGRAPHICAL IMPORTANCE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA  
Southeast Asia is geographically important as the Strait of Malacca, which is 
bordered by Malaysia and Indonesia, and connects to the Singapore Strait as shown in 
Figure 2, is one of the most active trade routes in the world. It is estimated that 
“approximately 50,000 vessels ferrying 40 percent of the world’s merchandise trade and 
25 percent of all oil shipments carried by sea annually” pass through the Strait of 
Malacca.22 Additionally, the unimpeded operation of the Strait of Malacca trade routes is 
vital to key U.S. allies in the Asia Pacific region, as many countries within Asia are energy 
dependent. As the strait is the region’s primary trade route, instability or conflict in the 
region would significantly impact the ability for key allies to obtain vital resources. 
Approximately 80 percent of the PRC’s oil imports traverse the Strait of Malacca, and as 
an U.S. ally, Singapore’s entryway to the strait could be used by the United States as a 
choke point.23 Obtaining influence over the Strait of Malacca will remain a key security 
objective for the PRC until it is able to diversify its trade routes to obtain energy 
resources.24 
 
22 David Shambaugh, “U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive 
Coexistence?,” International Security 42, no. 04 (2018): 85–127. 
23 Ana Singh, “The Malacca Dilemma: A Hindrance to Chinese Ambitions in the 21st Century – 





Created with Visme map generator. 
Figure 2. Key Maritime Straits of Southeast Asia 
C. IMPORTANCE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA TO THE PRC 
In addition to security interests, the PRC has both economic and geopolitical 
interests in Southeast Asia. Since 2012, the PRC has been navigating the effects of a 
slowing economy that has contributed to political and social instability within the PRC.25 
Part of the PRC’s strategy to mitigate the slowing economy has been to improve its 
relationships in Asia. The PRC has specifically identified countries within Southeast Asia 
as strategic partners to increase regional diplomacy and economic cooperation, and 
participate in core elements of the BRI.26 For example, Singapore has played a key role in 
BRI planning, financing and logistics, while serving as a financial hub for PRC access to 
other countries within Southeast Asia.27 It is estimated that 60% of Southeast Asia’s 
 
25 Wang, “Offensive for Defensive.” 
26 Zhao, “China–Japan Compete for Infrastructure Investment.” 
27 Sarah Chan, “Singapore–China Connectivity and Its Role in the Belt and Road Initiative,” China: 
An International Journal 17, no. 4, November 2019, 39. 
8 
infrastructure initiatives receive financial and advisory services from financial institutions 
in Singapore.28 The favorable international reputation and transparent business practices 
of Singapore are a valuable element for securing investment, and promoting and 
developing PRC projects such as the BRI. Furthermore in 2019 Singapore and PRC defense 
ministries agreed to increase their bilateral engagements and security cooperation through 
activities such as maritime exercises that were set to begin in 2020.29 
A significant growth in trade between the PRC and Southeast Asia has resulted in 
the region becoming the “third largest trade partner of the PRC, the fourth largest foreign 
market and the second largest source of imports.”30 Furthermore, the PRC views Southeast 
Asian countries as strategic partners because the countries collectively engage in 
multilateral forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
East Asia Summit.31 In 2016, the PRC recommended that the ASEAN Connectivity Master 
Plan and BRI be collaborative in order to increase prosperity in the region.32 Increasing 
the number of bilateral infrastructure projects between the PRC and ASEAN countries at 
this magnitude could further expand financial interconnectedness and policy coordination 
between ASEAN nations and the PRC. 
The PRC also views Southeast Asia as a prime location to export its domestic 
industries such as coal and steel that are over capacity.33 The BRI has been identified as a 
platform to move the production of these industries, allowing Chinese workers to remain 
employed and decrease production within the PRC.34 Additionally, as projects such as 
railways are often designed and led by Chinese personnel, the PRC can use the BRI as a 
 
28 Hong Liu, Xin Fan, and Guanie Lim, “Singapore Engages the Belt and Road Initiative: Perceptions, 
Policies, and Institutions,” The Singapore Economic Review, May 15, 2020, 8, https://doi.org/10.1142/
S0217590820410015. 
29 Aqil Haziq Mahmud, “Singapore, China to Boost Defence Cooperation, Engage in Larger Military 
Exercises,” CNA, May 29, 2019. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/ singapore/singapore-china-
boost-defence-cooperation-military-exercises-11576402. 
30 Denoon, Ott, and Shulong, China, The United States, and the Future of Southeast Asia. 
31 Xue, “The Belt & Road Initiative.” 
32 Zhao, “China–Japan Compete for Infrastructure Investment.” 
33 Kong, “The Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia.” 
34 Kong.  
9 
mechanism to export its engineering and technical standards. Exporting the standards could 
contribute to Chinese companies receiving subsequent contracts due to compatibility issues 
with the technology standards of competing countries such as Japan.  
D. IMPORTANCE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA TO THE UNITED STATES 
For the United States, continued access to Southeast Asia and cooperation with 
nations in the region are vital to its security and trade interests. The continued autonomy 
of the countries and institutions within Southeast Asia enables open trade with U.S. 
companies, military collaboration where feasible, and freedom of navigation in 
international waterways.35 To address U.S. security concerns, the Trump administration 
has strengthened its alliances with Japan, Thailand and the Philippines, and enhanced 
security relationships with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia (see Figure 3).36 For 
instance, Thailand is a vital enabler of U.S. military force projection, as it allows the U.S. 
Navy to utilize its deep-water port at Sattahip. It is important to note that although Thailand 
is a longstanding ally of the United States, the Sino-U.S. rivalry within the region has 
resulted in Thailand walking a tightrope while attempting to balance its security 
relationship with the United States, and its economic and political relationship with the 
PRC. As pointed out by Pongphisoot Busbarat, unlike the majority of other U.S. allies in 
Asia, Thailand has cooperated with the PRC on political and economic issues at the 
expense of U.S. interests.37 The United States and the Philippines are also longstanding 
security partners, they conduct joint military exercises on a regular basis and the United 
States provides military aide and training to the Philippine Army. Additionally, the U.S.-
Singapore partnership has been reaffirmed, as Singapore continues to provide port access 
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to the U.S. Navy and collaborates with the U.S. military to support the security of Southeast 
Asia and ensure a free and unimpeded Indo-Pacific.38  
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Figure 3. U.S. Bilateral Relations in Southeast Asia39 
The United States is also proactively engaged in multilateral institutions within the 
region such as ASEAN. The United States has been involved with ASEAN member 
countries since 1977, and they have worked together in various areas such as economic 
integration, military assistance, transnational issues and maritime cooperation.40 A 
testament to U.S. regional commitment, the United States provided $342 million in foreign 
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aid to the Philippines in 2019, and has increased its cooperation with Vietnam and 
Indonesia as part of the United States’ and ASEAN’s goal of preserving stability in the 
region.41 
The alliances and partnerships that the United States maintains in Southeast Asia 
are an integral part of maintaining U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific. Similarly, the PRC 
is actively attempting to increase its influence within Southeast Asia. This analysis will 
investigate if the PRC’s economic investment is influencing the behavior of Southeast 
Asian countries. The nations within the region are politically, culturally and economically 
diverse, which presents an opportunity to analyze the behavior of a variety of nations within 
the same region, under simultaneous influence of multiple great powers. For example, 
noteworthy shifts in the region have started to occur, such as the communist nation of 
Vietnam increasing cooperation with the United States, and the democratic nation of the 
Philippines fostering closer ties to the PRC. Additionally, identifying the drivers of 
Southeast Asian nations’ responses to the BRI may provide information regarding potential 
power changes between the PRC and the United States. Furthermore, it may provide insight 
into how the United States can counter the PRC’s influence and sustain U.S. influence 
within the region.  
This thesis seeks to determine under what conditions, if any, does the economic 
investment of the PRC influence the behaviors of Southeast Asian countries? The initial 
step in understanding the PRC’s economic relationships and influence within the region is 
to conduct a literature review of relevant information.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
A significant amount of research has been conducted that analyzes the influence of 
the PRC and great power competition (GPC) within Southeast Asia. A large amount of 
information concerning the PRC’s influence focuses on its economic influence, which has 
recently expanded under the BRI. The preponderance of arguments views the PRC’s 
motivations for establishing the BRI as a method to gain geopolitical influence. Overall 
this view regards the BRI as a means for the PRC to change the dominance of U.S. 
influence in the Indo-Pacific region and reassert itself as the hegemon.42 However, a 
smaller portion of literature argues that the PRC’s motivations are economically focused 
and suggests that the BRI is a means for the PRC to increase its economic influence, and 
is not heavily influenced by political or security objectives.43 Overall, the schools of 
thought concerning GPC largely agree that competition will continue to intensify within 
the region due to the security concerns, and economic competitiveness between major 
powers such as the United States, the PRC and Japan. However, the discussions about the 
intentions of the PRC are ongoing, and will likely be debated for the immediate future.  
Although limited in scale when compared to GPC and influence, over the last 
several years, research has been conducted that assesses how Southeast Asian countries are 
responding to the PRC’s regional influence. The behavior of the majority of nations in the 
region is characterized as mixed or ambiguous, while Cambodia appears to be clearly 
aligned with the PRC, and the Philippines is increasingly becoming more aligned with the 
PRC. One of the reasons that some countries in the region are swaying towards the PRC is 
the potential for the BRI to provide substantial economic gains due to increased trade and 
enhanced access to global markets. However, some scholars argue that the BRI is a debt 
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trap for financially constrained countries.44 Another concern that scholars highlight is that 
the political and economic factors that are intertwined with the BRI will enable the PRC to 
exploit the varying interests of ASEAN countries and degrade cooperation within the 
organization.45 As ASEAN countries expand their political and economic relationships 
with the PRC for short-term benefits, they attempt to mitigate the aforementioned concerns 
by establishing fall back strategies in the event that the relationships prove to be troubling 
in the future.46  
A. SYNOPSIS: EVOLUTION OF PRC-ASEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP 
In 1978, the PRC established a national policy to promote reform and openness, 
which led to a gradual increase in its economic relationships, with an emphasis on 
international multilateral trade.47 The PRC was granted membership in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001, which would eventually elevate its trade value.48 However, 
after initially obtaining WTO membership, the PRC encountered some resistance that 
prevented it from gaining full access to all trade markets. As a result, the PRC refocused 
its economic strategy on regional economic cooperation. The PRC and ASEAN endorsed 
the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation in 2002, which 
allowed ASEAN and the PRC to engage in further negotiations, and resulted in the 2010 
establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA).49 This agreement 
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supported the PRC’s foreign policy objectives of increasing cooperation in East Asia and 
elevating the PRC’s regional status. The access to ASEAN countries through the CAFTA 
also provided the PRC the opportunity to focus on bilateral cooperation. Additionally, the 
CAFTA served as an entry point for countries in Southeast Asia to gain access to the PRC’s 
large consumer market and draw more foreign direct investment.50 
In addition to investment and trade, Liqin notes that the PRC and ASEAN have 
committed to economic cooperation in “agriculture, information and communications 
technology, human resources development, investment and Mekong River basin 
development.”51 While these partnerships have helped advance the development of 
ASEAN countries, there have been some negative financial drawbacks. For example, since 
2012 the PRC has slowly reversed its trade deficit with ASEAN to a trade surplus. The 
PRC’s exports to Southeast Asia grew from $106 billion in 2009 to $292 billion in 2016, 
and its imports from Southeast Asia increased from $106 billion to $183 billion.52 While 
Southeast Asian imports to the PRC did increase, their import growth is no comparison to 
the major trade surplus that the PRC achieved. The asymmetry of the economic relationship 
between the PRC and Southeast Asia has dramatically shifted in the PRC’s favor.  
B. GREAT POWER COMPETITION 
The PRC’s exponential rise has contributed to the reemergence of great power 
competition in the Indo-Pacific Region. The PRC has claimed a peaceful rise and has not 
outright reasserted a desire to dominate the region; however, as stated by David 
Shambaugh, the rivalry between the United States and the PRC “extends to the 
geostrategic, geoeconomic, geopolitical, military, cultural, scientific, technological, 
innovation, and many other domains.”53 In President Xi Jinping’s address at the Chinese 
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Communist Party’s 19th National Congress in 2017, he announced that “ China had begun 
a new era of confidence and capability as it moved closer to the world’s center stage.”54 
Xi went even further by declaring that “China would increase its efforts to change the 
international order, build a world-class military, and act as a political and economic model 
for others to emulate.”55 The PRC’s efforts to surpass other influential countries are 
evident, as the PRC has been increasingly competitive in specific areas such as industrial 
capacity, military modernization, technological advancement and economic support, which 
have previously been led by the United States and Japan.56 Overall, the BRI has been 
established as President Xi’s flagship initiative to expand the PRC’s influence on the 
regional and international stage. In the U.S. 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 
Trump administration highlighted that the PRC’s infrastructure investments reinforce its 
geopolitical aspirations.57 The NSS also directly categorized Chinese regional dominance 
as a threat to the sovereignty of many countries within the region.58 
The PRC’s increased economic power and influence facilitated the establishment 
of the BRI, which may provide the PRC with a platform to gain more influence in Asia and 
strategically outmaneuver the United States.59 As one of the most diverse and rapidly 
growing regions in the world, Southeast Asia has the potential to aid the PRC by bolstering 
the PRC’s economic influence in the region.60  A significant number of countries within 
Southeast Asia have already agreed to participate in the BRI, and formed closer economic 
ties to the PRC, and this may contribute to increasing the PRC’s power in the region and 
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decreasing the United States’ power. Although the PRC has attained significant economic 
influence regionally and globally, it is a common argument that the PRC’s influence will 
not change the status quo order. In Southeast Asia specifically, Xue Gong identifies three 
predominant limitations that prevent the PRC from replacing the United States as the 
dominant actor in the region: “(a) many regional states’ preference for U.S. dominance, (b) 
rivalry from Japan, India, and other major powers and ASEAN centrality, and (c) the PRC’s 
assertive South China Sea policy.”61  
Japan, an established power within the Indo-Pacific region, provides Southeast 
Asian countries another alternative to the PRC. The relationship between Japan and the 
PRC has included mutually beneficial cooperation when necessary, but since the 
establishment of the BRI, it has been characterized by aggressive competition. Japan has a 
well-established history of providing quality infrastructure in the region, which naturally 
positions the BRI as a direct competitor of Japan’s commercial interests. Shortly after the 
establishment of the BRI, Japan instituted the Expanded Partnership for Quality 
Infrastructure and has pledged to allocate approximately $200 billion between 2016 and 
2021 to support infrastructure projects within Asia.62 Japan has also advanced its 
commercial interests in the region, such as in 2016, when it entered a bilateral agreement 
with Thailand to develop a high-speed railway (HSR) shortly after Thailand cancelled its 
joint-financed HSR project with the PRC.63 The Japanese-led HSR is part of a $7B 
initiative to aid the infrastructure development of countries along the Mekong River, 
including Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand. The relations between Japan 
and the PRC will likely remain fragile as Japan is a key ally of the United States and is 
viewed by the PRC as a participant in the U.S. strategy to contain the PRC’s rise.64 
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The rise of the PRC has presented the United States—the current dominant power 
in the region—with a strategic challenge of maintaining its regional influence. The Obama 
administration refocused on Asia in 2009 in order to sustain the current power balance.65 
At the strategic level, the United States has employed its four elements of national power—
diplomatic, informational, military and economic—to sustain its influence. These powers 
have been used to engage with Asian countries and institutions to advance U.S. interests 
and are the foundation of U.S. alliances and partnerships. In regards to the PRC, the United 
States has primarily adopted a balancing strategy to deter the PRC from attempting to 
reassert itself as a regional hegemon.66 Balancing strategies are characterized by a nation 
under threat attempting to deter its opponent, and dedicating a significant amount of 
resources to achieve that objective. A central component of the U.S. strategy has included 
increasing the military capacity of regional partners and allies, and improving multilateral 
interoperability among them.67 In addition, the United States has enhanced its longstanding 
relationships in Asia by increasing economic and diplomatic engagements.  
C. SOFT POWER, HARD POWER AND SMART POWER 
In Joseph Nye’s work, power is defined as “one’s ability to affect the behavior of 
others to get what it wants.”68 Three common ways to exert power are coercion, payment 
and attraction. Hard power utilizes payment and coercion, and is typically related to 
tangibles such as money and force.69 In contrast, soft power, a term introduced by Nye in 
1990, is a source of influence that gets other countries to desire the same outcome as a 
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particular country by leveraging enticement or attraction.70 Nye describes the primary 
components of a nation’s soft power as “its culture (when it is pleasing to others), its values 
(when they are attractive and consistently practiced), and its policies (when they are seen 
as inclusive and legitimate).”71 In 2003, Nye developed the term smart power, which 
incorporates a combination of hard and soft power. Smart power was developed to oppose 
the idea that soft power can independently create effective foreign policy.72 Successful 
national strategies typically include smart power. 
In post-Cold War interactions with Southeast Asian countries, the United States has 
typically employed soft power and smart power, while the PRC has employed soft power 
or hard power. The United States’ employment of soft power is primarily though 
diplomacy, economic assistance, and cooperation in multilateral organizations. The 
majority of the PRC’s soft power activities in Southeast Asia include participation in 
multilateral forums, economic assistance, economic cooperation, and social and cultural 
exchanges.73 Although the PRC has achieved some success through the promotion of 
economic support, increased political engagements and support to ASEAN, it has been 
unable to effectively employ smart power due to inconsistent applications of soft and hard 
power. This is unlike the United States who strategically employs smart power by 
combining military and economic power with support from organizations such as the 
United States Agency for International Development and non-governmental 
organizations.74 Overall, the PRC’s soft power within Southeast Asia is being degraded, 
and it is partially attributed to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) hard power activities 
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in the region.75 There are several negative trends associated with the PLA’s security 
activities. For example, multiple countries are displaying suspicion of Chinese intent 
because of PLA aggression within the region. Also, Southeast Asian countries are 
encouraging external powers such as Japan and the United States to provide support in the 
region.76 Furthermore, several countries are diversifying their sources of external financial 
support instead of seeking primary economic assistance from the PRC.77  
The PRC’s inability to effectively employ smart power is problematic because a 
positive relationship with nations in Southeast Asia would demonstrate to the regional and 
international community that the PRC’s rise is not a threat to smaller countries.78 The PRC 
also shares significant economic and socio-cultural ties with Southeast Asia that must be 
sustained to increase the PRC’s strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, 
in order to compete with the soft power efforts from the United States, the PRC must 
demonstrate that it can be a good neighbor to Asian countries. Some countries have 
indicated a preference for U.S. dominance within the region due to its primary use of soft 
power and diplomatic cooperation. This preference is an indication that economic power 
and BRI investment cannot solidify the PRC’s position in the Indo-Pacific. 
D. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR OF COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Based on my analysis of the current literature, the contrasting views and interests 
of the United States and the PRC place Southeast Asian nations in a precarious position as 
they navigate relationships with both countries. They must carefully balance risk and 
reward as they determine in which areas to cooperate with or oppose the two powers. 
Currently within the region, the United States is widely recognized for its military power 
and diplomatic statecraft, while the PRC is recognized for its economic statecraft, and to a 
lesser degree its diplomatic statecraft. The variety of benefits that the two powers offer 
creates an environment where countries in Southeast Asia can be more selective when 
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engaging with the United States and the PRC. Basically, cooperation in one area does not 
equate to a strategic alignment, nor does opposition equate to a misalignment.79 Navigating 
significant relationships with both of these countries simultaneously has the potential for 
high rewards in the short term but may prove to be a high-risk bet with losses in the long-
term.80 As the risks and rewards are weighed, there are three primary strategies that can be 
utilized to balance power within the region: balancing, hedging and bandwagoning. 
1. Balancing 
Nations that enact a balancing strategy dedicate a significant amount of resources 
to attempt to contain the country that is a threat to them. Their behavior demonstrates that 
they are trying to deter the potential threat and are willing to fight the aggressor if they 
have to.81 During the Cold War, the non-communist nations in Southeast Asia joined 
Western powers to balance against the expansion of communism. Unlike today, communist 
powers such as the PRC were seen as an imminent threat to weaker, non-communist 
countries in the region.82 Currently, none of the countries in Southeast Asia are directly 
balancing against the PRC. Murphy attributes this to the financial incentives presented by 
the PRC, and to a lesser degree, the disincentives associated with the U.S. emphasis on 
human rights and democracy.83 Vietnam’s behavior towards the PRC is a partial exception, 
as it openly countered the PRC’s military assertiveness during the height of the South 
China Sea dispute.84 
 
 
79 Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge?”; Haacke, “The Concept of Hedging”; Murphy, “Great 
Power Rivalries.” 
80 Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge? “ 504. 
81 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 139. 
82 Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge?” 506. 
83 Murphy, “Great Power Rivalries.” 
84 Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge?” 
22 
2. Hedging 
Hedging can be focused against a particular country or against general uncertainty 
due to power shifts. This alignment option can be considered as a middle position that is 
characterized by contradictory behavior of power acceptance and power rejection. In 
Cheng-Chwee Kuik’s work on hedging in Southeast Asia, he describes hedging as a “point 
of neutrality” where countries strategically engage in selective collaboration and defiance 
of the same power.85 He further defines hedging as “insurance-seeking behavior under 
high-stakes and high-uncertainty situations, where a sovereign actor pursues a bundle of 
opposite and deliberately ambiguous policies vis-à-vis competing powers to prepare a 
fallback position should circumstances change.”86 Kuik’s view of hedging asserts that it 
must include three strategic principles: “an insistence on not taking sides among competing 
powers; the practice of adopting opposite and counteracting measures; and the use of the 
opposite acts as instruments to pursue the goals of preserving gains while cultivating a 
‘fallback’ position.”87 Kuik argues that in the post-Cold War era, the countries in Southeast 
Asia have primarily adopted a strategy of hedging towards the PRC to mitigate numerous 
risks and uncertainty, while maximizing benefits.  
3. Bandwagoning  
Countries that choose to bandwagon concede power to the aggressor country and 
align with it. Randall Schweller argues that the primary motivation for bandwagoning is 
often to gain profits from rising powers that offer aid to weaker countries that align with 
them.88 Mearsheimer suggests that bandwagoning is a dangerous position because, 
although the weaker state may gain some benefits, the threatening country attains more 
power.89  
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E. COMPETING INTERESTS AMONG SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES  
The PRC’s elaborate economic and political engagement in Southeast Asia has 
intensified the competing interests of the nations within the region. The PRC is keen on 
leveraging the multilateral forums that Southeast Asian nations have created, such as 
ASEAN and the East Asia Summit. The ability of Southeast Asian countries to cooperate 
within these mechanisms has contributed to their value as a strategic asset. However, 
ASEAN heavily prides itself on centrality and consensus building, while the PRC often 
prefers to engage individual countries bilaterally, which has caused negative impacts to the 
organization. While not a member of ASEAN, the PRC has influenced member countries, 
Cambodia in particular, through the use of political and economic coercion. Overall, this 
intentional manipulation and disruption benefit the PRC but weaken ASEAN; Huong Le 
Thu categorized the PRC’s strategy towards ASEAN as a strategy of “coercion and 
inducement.”90 If Le Thu’s assertion is correct, the weakening of ASEAN is a benefit for 
the PRC. The PRC has been able to create a wedge between the diverse member countries 
of ASEAN by enticing individual countries with short-term economic gains. However, it 
will likely result in long-term negative consequences as the organization’s ability to reach 
consensus on key regional issues has been degraded. 
Many scholars have highlighted the potential negative impacts of the PRC’s 
influence over ASEAN countries. For example, Ian Storey argues that due to the nature of 
the PRC’s rise within East Asia, it may not only change the relationship between Southeast 
Asia and the PRC, but also the inherent relations within ASEAN itself.91 For example, in 
2012 for the first time in ASEAN’s 45-year history, it failed to issue a joint communique 
due to members disagreeing on whether to include language that reflected the 
confrontations that the PRC had initiated towards the Philippines and Vietnam in the South 
China Sea.92 It was reported that prior to the ASEAN meeting, the PRC aggressively 
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pushed the members not to discuss any issues related to the South China Sea.93 Ultimately, 
even though the PRC’s aggression in the South China Sea had been discussed at length 
during the ASEAN meeting, Cambodian officials insisted that the incidents be omitted 
from the joint statement because they were bilateral issues. Although not present at the 
ASEAN meeting, the PRC was able to successfully control the behavior of Cambodian 
officials in order to disrupt a group consensus to oppose the PRC’s behavior in the South 
China Sea. Furthermore, after the July 2016 United Nations Convention for the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines case regarding PRC 
incursions into its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the newly elected Duterte 
administration issued a conservative response and did not use the ruling to reassert control 
of its traditional territory.94 Tomotaka Shoji suggests that this was a missed opportunity 
for ASEAN to resolve the South China Sea issues, and may have encouraged the PRC to 
continue its maritime aggression.95 Moreover, in 2017, when the Philippines was the 
ASEAN chair, Duterte continued his stance of not directly confronting the PRC on South 
China Sea issues, and dissuaded the other ASEAN members from strongly opposing the 
PRC’s maritime behavior in the institution’s annual statement. Southeast Asian countries 
are concerned that this type of influence from the PRC will deliberately weaken the unity 
of the organization. Ultimately, there is potential for the PRC’s influence to degrade the 
autonomy of ASEAN countries if they establish a trend of prioritizing economics over 
security.  
F. LITERATURE GAP 
Despite the significant amount of research concerning the PRC’s influence in 
Southeast Asia, a research gap still exists. Overall, the current literature primarily focuses 
on the South China Sea, and the strategy of Southeast Asian countries’ avoidance of 
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challenging the PRC directly, and averting alignment too closely with the United States. 
However, it does not deeply assess if the PRC’s economic influence is creating measurable 
change in the behavior of Southeast Asian nations. Additionally, research on great power 
competition within the region is often based on the PRC’s potential based on its growing 
economic status, but does not quantitatively assess under which conditions the PRC’s 
economic investment affects its influence in the region.  
The current literature is comprehensively researched and documented, but does not 
provide enough information on the measurable behavior of Southeast Asian countries and 
what it reveals about the PRC’s economic influence, and the subsequent impact to the great 
power dynamic. Based on this gap in research, this investigation seeks to answer: What 
does a quantitative analysis of the behaviors of Southeast Asian countries indicate about 
the influence of the PRC’s economic investment within the region? 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
Based on the review of the current literature it is evident that the PRC previously 
succeeded in filling the gap left by the United States’ reprioritization away from Southeast 
Asia to the Middle East after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As the United States was engaged 
in the war on terror, the PRC increased its bilateral engagements in Southeast Asia and 
secured partnerships that contest the regional influence of the United States. Additionally, 
the Trump administration’s reversal of the Obama administration’s economic commitment 
to Southeast Asia through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) made the reliability of U.S. 
support to the region more uncertain. The TPP was an opportunity for countries in the 
region to diversify economically and become less dependent on the PRC.96 Although the 
PRC’s influence is not necessarily greater than U.S. influence, PRC influence is evident in 
situations such as the Duterte administration’s willingness to make multiple changes in its 
security relationship with the United States. Even though the two countries maintain an 
active alliance, Duterte has reduced the scale and number of joint military exercise, ended 
the Philippine-US Navy joint patrols in the South China Sea and suggested that he may 
initiate revisions to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.97 
To futher understand the complex relationships between the countries in Southeast 
Asia, the PRC, and the United States, a qualitiative review of 6 countries within the region 
was conducted. A qualitiative perspective was sought to ascertain a more holistic view of 
the behavior identified in the quanitiative analysis of vote alignment with the PRC. The 
primary areas that were researched were major economic partnerships, security 
partnerships, relationships with other major powers, and South China Sea conflicts. All of 
these areas are key factors in understanding the dynamics that can potentially affect the 
alignment of countries in Southeast Asia with the PRC.  
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The countries reviewed have a diverse spectrum of concerns due to the different 
sizes of their economies, levels of democracy, security concerns and domestic issues. 
Recognizing the complexity and mixed priorities of the nations within the region is an 
important element of understanding why their behavior is oftten characterized by 
ambiguity and mixed responses. With this consideration in mind, first a brief selection of 
key information will be presented about Indonesia, then Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
A. INDONESIA  
1. Key Data Points 
• BRI Investment Total (2013-2018): $28.2 billion 
• Exports to PRC: $34 billion in 2018 (19.5% increase from 2017) 
• Imports from PRC: $43 billion in 2018 (24% increase from 2017) 
• Debt to GDP Ratio: 29.80 (8/11 highest indebted nations in Southeast 
Asia) 
• Level of Democracy/Autocracy: 9 (democracy) 
2. Discussion 
Indonesia has the largest economy in Southeast Asia and in regard to purchasing 
power parity, it has the 10th largest economy in the world.98 Additionally, it has the fourth 
highest population in the world. Indonesia also has a strong democracy, and has 
successfully maintained political stabiliy. Indonesia also has a history of helping preserve 
stability and autonomy within the region by leading in multilateral institutions such as 
ASEAN.99  
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As the third largest democracy in the world, Indonesia and the United States 
maintain longstanding key partnerships. In 2010, the two countries developed the U.S.-
Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership which was later upgraded to a Strategic Partnership 
in 2015, and signified enhanced coooperation of their shared interests and democratic 
principles.100 Additionally, in 2018 the United States and Indonesia traded $29 billion in 
goods and the United States provided Indonesia $11.1 billion in FDI.101 
On the economic front, Indonesia also maintains significant connections to the 
PRC. For instance, Indonesia has increased its economic ties with the PRC through 
infrastructure investments, and sought to finance approximately $1.86 billion through the 
AIIB to improve maritime infrastructure and ports.102 However, Indonesia has attempted 
to offset economic dependence on the PRC by extending some major contracts to Japan. 
Diplomatically, Indonesia has a farily stable relationship with the PRC, but the PRC has 
instigated some security concerns for Indonesia. For example, PRC fishing vessels have 
been caught illegally fishing in Indonesia’s EEZ, and when Indonesia attempted to arrest 
the offenders, the PRC physically interfered.103  
As a nation that consist of over 17,000 islands, maritime threats are national 
secuirty issues. Even though the PRC has periodically made incursions into Indonesia’s 
EEZ, the geographic distance reduces the maritime threat from the PRC. It has been argued 
that Indonesia’s mild response to the maritime threat is largely attributed to President 
Jokowi’s personal interest in securing financing from the PRC for key infrastrucutre 
projects.104 In contrast to the balance of power theory, Indonesia has not attempted to 
balance against the PRC. Instead, Indonesia has adopted a strategy of hedging and has 
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enhanced its partnerships with South Korea, Brazil, Japan, Australia, and India, in addition 
to its relationships with the PRC and the United States.  
B. MALAYSIA 
1. Key Data Points 
• BRI Investment Total (2013-2018): $30.6 billion 
• Exports to PRC: $63 billion in 2018 (16.3% increase from 2017) 
• Imports from PRC: $45 billion in 2018 (9.91% increase from 2017) 
• Debt to GDP Ratio: 51.21 (4/11 highest indebted nations in Southeast 
Asia) 
• Level of Democracy/Autocracy: 5 (anocracy)  
2. Discussion 
The United States and Malaysia have strong economic and security cooperation. 
The two countries partner in areas such as trade, counterrorism, regional stabilility, 
maritime situational awareness, and environmental issues.105 In 2014, Malaysia and the 
United States upgraded their relationship to a Comprehensive Partnership. Malaysia also 
upgraded its status from observer to participant in the U.S. Cobra Gold exercises.106 
Additionally, Malaysia is a large trading partern of the United States; in 2018 they engaged 
in $52.2 billion in bilateral trade.107 The United States also holds an estimated $15.1 billion 
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Malaysia is one of the ASEAN countries involved in the South China Sea dispute 
with the PRC. The PRC has intruded into Malaysian waterways many times and has even 
planted a PRC flag in the Malaysian EEZ.108 Malaysia has attempted to avoid direct 
confrontation with the PRC and instead tried to deter PRC agression by leveraging 
multilateral institutions such as ASEAN and supporting U.S. freedom of navigation 
activities. In despite of the maritime security concerns, Malaysia has enhanced its security 
and economic cooperation with the PRC to include acquiring four littoral ships.109 
Malaysia has been characterized as leaning towards bandwagoning with the PRC for 
financial gain; however, as argued by Noor and Qistina, this perspective does not properly 
account for the defense partnership that it maintains with the United States.110 
Additionally, Malaysia is a member of other defense collaborations such as the Five Power 
Defense Agreement, along with New Zealand, Great Britain, Singapore and Australia. 
Consistent with the concept of hedging, Malaysia has simultaneously expanded its 
relationships with multiple powers, including the United States and the PRC.  
C. PHILIPPINES 
1. Key Data Points 
• BRI Investment Total (2013–2018): $5.2 billion 
• Exports to PRC: $20 billion in 2018 (7.05% increase from 2017) 
• Imports from PRC: $35 billion in 2018 (9.49% increase from 2017) 
• Debt to GDP Ratio: 38.92 (5/11 highest indebted nations in Southeast 
Asia) 
• Level of Democracy/Autocracy: 8 (democracy) 
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2. Discussion 
The Philippines has one of the most diverse and promising economies in Southeast 
Asia. Since 2010, it has maintained a yearly growth rate of 6.4% and has expanded its 
middle-class.111 Similar to other nations in Southeast Asia, the Philippines has significant 
economic ties to the United States and the PRC. The United States and the Philippines 
traded more than $27 billion in services and goods in 2018.112 The United States is also 
one of the top foreign investors in the Philippines.  
As democratic countries, the United States and the Philippines have many interests 
that align such as security and freedom of navigation in Southeast Asia. However, the 
overall relationship between the countries has ebbed and flowed. For example, while the 
U.S. was focused on the global war on terrorism in the Middle East, and the second front 
in Southeast Asia, less emphasis was placed on traditional foreign policy relationships with 
the Philippines. In 2002, then Philippiine President Arroyo received significant domestic 
backlash against allowing the U.S. military to launch combat operations out of the country 
against the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf.113 As political instability ensued, Arroyo increased 
bilateral ties with the PRC in an attempt to rebalance the U.S-Philippine relationship, and 
decrease domestic concerns about dependence on the United States. 
During the mid-2000s, as the Philippinees increased its bilateral ties to the PRC it 
ignored most of the PRC’s aggression in the South China Sea. However, tensions were 
renewed in 2009 when the PRC announced its nine-dashed line claim. After the U.S. pivot 
to the Indo-Pacific in 2009, the Philippines was presented with an oppurtunity to enhance 
its relationship with the United States.114 As a result, the Philippines increased its defense 
cooperation with the United Sates and bolstered their military capabilities to deter the 
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PRC’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea. This security enhancement was 
consistent with the Aquino administration’s (2010-2016) primary strategy of balancing, 
and leveraging multilateral organizations to deter the PRC’s aggressive behavior.  
During the Aqnino administration, the Philippines also brought a case against the 
PRC’s maritime claim to the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal, which ruled in favor of the 
Philippines in July 2016.115 However, shortly after President Rodrigo Duterte came to 
power in 2016, he began advocating for the Philippines to shift away from the United States 
to the PRC. Dutuerte’s stance may be partially attributed to his anti-American beliefs and 
the U.S. failure to enforce the Scarborough Shoal 2012 deal which resulted in the PRC 
asserting physical control over the area.116 Additionally, the U.S. lack of clarity on whether 
it would support the Philippines under the Mutual Defense Treaty if a conflict occurred 
with the PRC in the South China Sea dispute likely contributed to less cooperation with 
the United States. Furthermore, U.S. views on human rights and its criticism of Duterte’s 
violent crackdown against drug dealers influenced the Duterte administration’s foreign 
policy shift to the PRC. 
D. SINGAPORE 
1. Key Data Points 
• BRI Investment Total from (20132–018): $28.4 billion 
• Exports to PRC: $33 billion in 2018 (1.78% decrease from 2017) 
• Imports from PRC: $49 billion in 2018 (10.6% increase from 2017) 
• Debt to GDP Ratio: 114.34 (1/11 highest indebted nations in Southeast 
Asia) 
• Level of Democracy/Autocracy: -2 (anocracy) 
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2. Discussion 
Singapore is credited with being one of the most competitive economies in the 
world.117 Its GDP growth rate is one of the highest in the world, with an average increase 
of 7.2% per year since the late 1960s. Singapore has deep economic relationships with the 
PRC. The PRC has been the top investment location for Singapore since 1997.118 
Singapore is also the largest recipient of PRC foreign investment and the PRC is 
Singapore’s largest trading partner.119 However, Singapore is the only nation within 
Southeast Asia that does not require support from the PRC for internal development 
projects.120 
Singapore also serves as a prominent financial hub for PRC enterprises, utilizing 
its reputation in international banking, market accessibility, and significant resources in 
master planning and logistics to support the advancement of efforts such as the BRI.121 
Singapore could make significant financial profits by serving as a middle-man for BRI 
planning and financing in Southeast Asia.  
Although Singapore is not directly engaged in the territorial disputes with the PRC, 
issues that affect the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea present economic and 
security concerns for Singapore. The potential for the PRC’s South China Sea activities to 
create issues for Singapore, underscores the importance of the U.S.-Singapore relationship. 
The United States and Singapore share significant economic and military partnerships. 
They have a Free Trade Agreement, and traded approximately $73.9 billion in goods and 
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services in 2018.122 The United States is also the largest foreign investor in Singapore. 
Furthermore, in 2015, the United States and Singapore completed the Enhanced Defense 
Cooperation Agreement.123  
The leaders of Singapore have expressed their intent to maintain a good relationship 
with all major powers, and prefer not to choose between aligning with the United States or 
the PRC.124 As a result, Singapore strategically partners with the United States to hedge 
against the PRC’s regional hard power tactics, but uses the BRI to gain economic leverage 
in opposition of the United States.  
E. THAILAND 
1. Key Data Points 
• BRI Investment Total (2013–2018): $7.7 billion 
• Exports to PRC: $44 billion in 2018 (7.98% increase from 2017) 
• Imports from PRC: $42 billion in 2018 (11.5% increase from 2017) 
• Debt to GDP Ratio: 34.01 (7/11 highest indebted nations in Southeast 
Asia)  
• Level of Democracy/Autocracy: -3 (anocracy) 
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2. Discussion 
Over the last forty years Thailand has made extraordinary economic progress and 
become the second largest economy in Southeast Asia. It’s economic growth slowed in 
2018 and is partially attributed to a decreased demand of exports because of the U.S.-China 
trade war.125 However, Thailand still maintains strong connections with both countries.  
The relationship between the United States and Thailand includes economic and 
security partnerships. On the economic front, Thailand and the United States traded $44.5 
billion in goods in 2018. The United States also invested approximately $17 billion of FDI 
in Thailand stock.126 As important security allies they also have significant diplomatic 
relations. In 2013, Thailand was designated as a Major Non-NATO Ally of the United 
States.127 They also conduct mutiple joint military exercises in support of their roles as 
mutual defense partners. For instance, Cobra Gold is the largest multinational military 
exercise in the Indo-Pacific, and is co-hosted yearly by Thailand and the United States. 
Thailand also receives training, supplies and military equipment from the United States. 
Additionally, as an enabler of U.S. military force projection, Thailand provides access of 
its deep-water port at Sattahip to the U.S. Navy.128 
Unlike other countries in Southeast Asia that have experienced maritime 
aggression, Thailand is a mainland country, and has not experienced the same threatening 
behavior from the PRC. Thailand has expanded its economic and military relationships 
with the PRC, but it also maintains its alliance with the United States. Ultimately, Thailand 
maintains a strategy of hedging but it is notable that while its relationship with the United 
States declined after the 2014 military coup, its cooperation with the PRC increased.129  
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F. VIETNAM 
1. Key Data Points 
• BRI Investment Total (2013–2018): $8.8 billion 
• Exports to PRC: $64 billion in 2018 (27% increase from 2017) 
• Imports from PRC: $84 billion in 2018 (17.3% increase from 2017) 
• Debt to GDP Ratio: 55.56 (3/11 highest indebted nations in Southeast 
Asia) 
• Level of Democracy/Autocracy: -7 (autocracy) 
2. Discussion 
Vietnam is a relatively poor country but has experienced significant political 
reforms and economic development over the last 30 years. During the period between 2002 
to 2018 Vietnam elevated its GDP per capita by 2.7 times and lifted 45 million people out 
of poverty.130 The United States and Vietnam conducted $81.3 billion in trade in 2019 and 
the United States invested $2.6 billion in FDI in Vietnam.131 
The United States and Vietnam normalized diplomatic relations in 1995 and have 
steadily increased cooperation. The current relationship was solidified in the 2013 U.S.-
Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, and has been enhanced as the bilateral relationship 
has grown. Additionally, the United States abolished its ban that prohibited the sale of 
lethal weapons to Vietnam in 2016.132 The progression of Vietnam’s relationship with the 
United States is a significant element of its shift in foreign policy, which at one time 
preferred cooperating with the PRC because they shared a socialist ideology. Since the 
1990s Vietnam has focused more on protecting its national interest than aligning with other 
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socialist governments.133 This progressive change in Vietnam’s foreign policy has placed 
it in a better position to protect its national interest as it leverages support to address the 
PRC’s maritime aggression.  
Although Vietnam and the PRC have strong economic ties and elevated their 
bilateral relationship to a strategic cooperative partnership in 2013, it has not aided in 
deterring PRC activity in the South China Sea. For instance, the PRC prevented Vietnam 
fisherman from entering historical fishing grounds, sent an oil exploration rig into 
Vietnam’s EEZ, and used forced against them when they tried to safeguard the area.134 In 
response, Vietnam increased its defense cooperation with the United States to enhance their 
military capabilities to counter PRC aggressiveness in the South China Sea.  
Vietnam has been a supporter of U.S. rebalancing within the region; however, it is 
not directly balancing against the PRC. Vietnam’s defense policy of “three nos” prevents 
it from joining the U.S. efforts to directly balance against the PRC. The policy states that 
“Vietnam will not join alliances, will not grant any country permission to have military 
bases in Vietnam, and will not grant permission for any country to use its soil to carry out 
military activities against other countries.”135  
Overall, Vietnam has attempted to remain autonomous and avoid being pulled into 
a major conflict by entering into strategic relationships with the United States, Japan, 
China, India and Russia.136 Vietnam’s strategy of engaging in multilateral organizations, 
partnering with multiple major countries, and selectively defying PRC aggression is a 
classic example of hedging. 
The next chapter presents the primary analysis of the research. It includes the data 
sources, methodology and research design used to assess the relationship between PRC 
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investment and the UNGA vote alignment of countries in Southeast Asia. Additionally, it 
presents the major findings of the assessment and broader implications. 
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IV. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
In order to analyze the hypotheses, I utilized a quantitative approach to examine the 
relationship between the PRC’s economic activity and the measurable behavior of 
Southeast Asian countries. This investigation leveraged public open source databases that 
collect data on global trade, foreign direct investment, aid (including loans and grants), 
BRI investment, Gross Domestic Product, level of democracy and United Nations General 
Assembly voting. Data was compiled on Southeast Asia and the PRC for the period of 
2000–2018. The data range started in the year 2000 to identify voting behavior prior to the 
economic boom in the PRC and the establishment of the BRI in 2013. This chapter is 
divided into five sections. First, each data source will be explained, then hypotheses, 
methodology, model design and results will be discussed. 
A. DATA SOURCES 
This research utilizes multiple online public datasets for analysis. The complete list 
of data sources includes China Global Investment Tracker from the American Enterprise 
Institute, the World Develop Indicator of Gross Domestic Product by the World Bank, the 
United Nations General Assembly Voting Data from Harvard Dataverse, the Center for 
Systematic Peace, Polity5 dataset, the United Nations Comtrade Database and AidData’s 
Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset. The datasets can be found at the following 
websites: 
1. The China Global Investment Tracker  
https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/ 
2. The World Development Indicator of Gross Domestic Product  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 




4. The Polity5 Dataset 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
5. The United Nations Comtrade Database 
https://comtrade.un.org/Data/ 




1. China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT) 
The American Enterprise Institute – China Global Investment Tracker is a public 
dataset that tracks the PRC’s global foreign investment from private companies and state-
owned enterprises.137 The tracker captures annual transactions globally from 2005–
2020.138 Although the PRC is known to lack transparency in its economic activities, the 
CGIT dataset includes a comprehensive collection of available information. However, the 
tracker only includes transactions with a minimum threshold of $100 million from Chinese 
parent companies to countries other than the PRC.139 The dataset also highlights 
transactions that are categorized by the PRC as BRI projects. For the purposes of this study, 
the dataset from CGIT was used to establish two independent variables: foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and BRI investment.  
2. The World Development Indicator of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
The World Development Indicator of GDP data provides the total value of the 
services and goods produced in a country. GDP is a common indicator of a country’s 
overall economic status. This World Bank database reports on annual changes in economic 
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factors through real growth, price inflation and exchange rates. The data bank has a 
collection of data from internationally recognized sources and spans from the period of 
1960 to 2019.140  
3. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Voting Data 
The voting data was collected from the UNGA Voting Dataset from Harvard 
Dataverse, which is a dataset of roll-call votes in the UNGA from 1946 to 2019.141 The 
UN documents each vote as Yes, No, Abstention or non-participating. UNGA voting data 
was utilized to ascertain a vote score, which served as the dependent variable for the 
entirety of the study. 
4. Polity5 Dataset 
The Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research’s Polity5 dataset, which 
tracks levels of democracy in all states that have a population of over five hundred thousand 
people, was used to control for level of democracy.142  The dataset scores independent 
countries from the period of 1800 to 2018. The polity score captures the level of 
democracy, ranging from an absolute dictatorship (-10) to a consolidated democracy 
(+10).143  This data was utilized as a control variable, as it is a source of influence that 
could affect the behavior of Southeast Asian countries.  
5. United Nations Comtrade Database 
The United Nations Comtrade Database is the largest repository for global trade 
data. It was utilized to compile annual trade data between the PRC and Southeast Asia. The 
dataset includes global trade statistics from more than 170 countries and covers the period 
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from 1962–2020. In total the dataset includes over 3 billion data records of global trade 
transactions.144  
6. AidData’s Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset 
The AidData dataset, provided by the College of William and Mary, tracks Chinese 
overseas official finance data from 2000 to 2014.145  The dataset includes development 
projects that meet the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s criteria 
for Official Development Assistance.146 It also includes official Chinese projects that “lack 
development intent or are provided with higher interest rates and lower grant elements.”147 
Although this dataset captures official Aid, Loans and Grants from the PRC, one drawback 
of the dataset is that it only covers the period of 2000 to 2014, which creates a four-year 
gap in this study for PRC Aid, Loans and Grants.  
B. HYPOTHESES 
My hypotheses attempt to identify under what conditions, if any, would PRC 
economic investment, GDP, and levels of democracy affect the behaviors of countries 
within Southeast Asia. More specifically, is there a methodic relationship between the 
dependent variable [UNGA votes], independent variables: Trade Total, Trade Balance, 
BRI Investment, FDI and Aid; and the control variables: Polity or GDP? Considering these 
variables, I examined three hypotheses in this research: 
• The PRC’s influence will be greater in countries where it provides a 
higher amount of BRI investment.  
 
144 UN Comtrade Database: Trade Statistics, accessed June 12, 2020, https://comtrade.un.org/Data/. 
145 A Dreher et al., “Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance 
Dataset. AidData Working Paper #46” (Williamsburg, VA: AidData., 2017), https://www.aiddata.org/data/
chinese-global-official-finance-dataset. 
146 “Official Development Assistance (ODA),” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, accessed October 29, 2020, https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/
development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm. 
147 Dreher et al., “Aid, China, and Growth.” 
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• High levels of economic partnerships between the PRC and Southeast 
Asian countries will be associated with favorable support for PRC 
interests. 
• Southeast Asian countries will attempt to balance the PRCs influence, 
when economic relationships are in the PRCs favor. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Each hypothesis examines the relationship between the PRC’s economic 
investment in Southeast Asia and the measurable behavior of Southeast Asian countries. 
The economic relationships are categorized as Trade Total; Trade Balance; BRI 
Investment; Foreign Direct Investment; and Aid, Loans and Grants. To analyze the 
hypotheses, I conducted a quantitative study of the variables included in each dataset. The 
program R was utilized to combine the data into one large dataset, and then executed an 
Ordinary Least Squares regression model to assess the relationship, if any, between the 
dependent and independent variables.  
1. Unit of Analysis and Variables 
The unit of analysis for this research is country-year. In structuring the dataset for 
analysis, the data was reconstructed into this format to assign a single value for each 
variable by country-year. When necessary, logarithmic transformation was conducted to 
reduce the skewness of the data by adding a quantity of 1. 
a. Dependent Variable 
UNGA Votes: UNGA Votes are drawn from the roll-call of UNGA votes that 
occurred from 1946–2019.148 For this study, all votes were measured based on two criteria: 
a vote that aligned with the PRC’s vote (Yes/Yes or No/No) or a vote that opposed the 
PRC’s vote (Yes/No). A value of 1 was assigned to each vote that aligned with the PRC 
and a value of 0 was assigned to each opposing vote. Then, a score was calculated for each 
country-year, equal to the proportion of UNGA vote alignment with the PRC. 
 
148 Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey, “United Nations General Assembly Voting Data.” 
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b. Independent Variables 
• Trade Total: This variable is calculated by adding the total amount of 
imports and exports between each country and the PRC. This data was 
standardized in USD and log transformed to normalize the data.149  
• Trade Balance: This variable is calculated by dividing the amount of 
exports from the PRC to each specific country by the trade total. This data 
was standardized in USD. 
• BRI Investment: This variable contains the sum of BRI investments from 
the PRC to each country. The data was standardized in USD and log 
transformed to normalize the data. 
• Foreign Direct Investment: This variable consists of the sum of the PRC’s 
foreign direct investment in each country from both commercial and state-
owned enterprises. This data was standardized in USD and log 
transformed to normalize the data. 
• Aid, Loans and Grants: This variable includes the sum of aid, loans and 
grants from the PRC to each country. This data was standardized in USD 
and log transformed to normalize the data. 
c. Control Variables 
• GDP: The purpose of this variable is to improve the reliability of the 
analysis by accounting for a respective country’s wealth and the size of its 





• Polity: The purpose of this variable is to control for a given country’s level 
of democracy. The polity score identifies the level of democracy, with a 
range from an absolute dictatorship at -10 to a consolidated democracy at 
+10. 
D. MODEL DESIGN 
To conduct the analysis of the variables and their potential relationships, I 
developed several linear regression models. During the process of analyzing the models, I 
used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to increase predictive accuracy and determine 
which model was the best fit for the dataset. When utilizing AIC, the model with the lowest 
AIC score will be the most applicable in forming accurate predictions.150 Initially, all 
independent variables and control variables were included in the regression. The accuracy 
of the model increased as statistically insignificant variables were removed and interaction 
terms were introduced to identify the relationships between the variables. Interactions were 
assessed by adding a term to a model where two independent variables are multiplied. 
When a significant interaction occurs, it “indicates that the effect of one predictor variable 
on the response variable is different at different values of the other predictor variable.”151 
In this study, interaction terms enabled a more holistic assessment of economic investment 
across a dynamic group of countries with different levels of wealth and democracy. Table 
1 displays ten of the primary regression models, with the statistical significance of each 
variable annotated by asterisks predicated on the p-value. Within the models, if no results 
are present, those variables were found to be statistically insignificant and therefore not 
included in the model. As shown in Table 1, the model with the best fit based on lowest 
AIC score was Model 1. The model includes all of the variables discussed previously, plus 
interactions between GDP and Polity, GDP and trade balance, GDP and trade total, and 
BRI investment and Aid, Loans and Grants. 
  
 
150 DeWayne R. Derryberry, Basic Data Analysis for Time Series with R (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 
& Sons, Incorporated, 2014), 106. 
151 Karen Grace-Martin, “Interpreting Interactions in Regression,” January 19, 2009, 
https://www.theanalysisfactor.com/interpreting-interactions-in-regression/. 
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Narrowing down from the ten models displayed in the regression table, a 
comparison of the coefficients of the six models with the lowest AIC scores is shown in 
Figure 4, with each model designated as a different color. The dashed lines represent the 
95% confidence intervals and the circular points represent the coefficient. The points to the 
left of the 95% confidence intervals represent a negative association with voting score, and 
the points to the right represent a positive association with voting score. Model 1, shown 
in blue, has the lowest AIC score of the six models. Model 1 shows with high confidence 
that polity and BRI investment is negatively correlated with vote score, while trade balance, 
GDP, trade total, and aid, loans, and grants are positively associated. FDI is considered 
unreliable due to the 95% confidence interval crossing the 0 line.  
 
Figure 4. Regression Coefficients of Top Six Models Based on AIC Score 
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A surface-level examination of the voting alignment of Southeast Asian countries 
is shown in Figure 5. It is apparent that Southeast Asian countries have an overall high 
voting concurrence with the PRC. The mean vote score of all countries in the region from 
2000 to 2018 is 0.78. In comparison, the United States’ vote alignment with the PRC has 
a mean of 0.16. As shown in Figure 5, Southeast Asia’s overall vote alignment with the 
PRC increased from approximately the year 2000 to 2007, and then started to decline. The 
congruent voting patterns take a noticeable decline in 2013, the same year that the BRI was 
established, and have continued in a negative trajectory. Next, a deeper analysis of the four 
statistically significant findings shown in Figures 6 and 7 will be discussed. 
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Figure 5. Southeast Asia Vote Score Alignment with the PRC from 2000–2018153
 
153 Adapted from Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey, “United Nations General Assembly Voting Data.” 
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(1) HYPOTHESIS 1: The PRC’s influence will be greater in countries 
where it provides a higher amount of BRI investment.  
The results of the analysis revealed that the relationship between BRI investment 
and vote alignment is situational. Specifically, in the absence of Aid, Loans and Grants, 
BRI investment has a negative effect; however, when there is high investment in both the 
BRI and Aid, Loans and Grants, there is a strong alignment with the PRC. Figure 6 displays 
these significant findings.  
 
Figure 6. UNGA Vote Score by BRI Investment Displayed by Total of PRC 
Aid, Loans and Grants to Southeast Asia 
Figure 6 is a graphic visualization of the interaction of UNGA vote score, BRI 
investment, and Aid, Loans and Grants. BRI investment [independent variable] is shown 
on the x-axis and the vote score [dependent variable] is shown on the y-axis (higher score 
is higher vote alignment). Finally, Aid, Loans and Grants [independent variable] is 
displayed in a range by color, in which the highest amount of investment is green, the 
median investment is blue, and the lowest range of investment is red. The first significant 
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finding is observed by the slope of the red line decreasing when there is high BRI 
investment and low levels of Aid, Loans and Grants. This demonstrates negative behavior 
change towards the PRC under these economic investment conditions. In contrast, the 
second finding shows that at the highest level of Aid, Loans and Grants, the slope of the 
green line increases as BRI investment increases. This demonstrates behavior change in 
favor of the PRC when there is high investment of both of these variables. When assessed 
as an individual variable; Aid, Loans and Grants was found to be insignificant, as shown 
in Table 1.  
The first finding contradicts Hypothesis 1, which anticipated a positive relationship 
between vote score and high amounts of BRI investment. This finding may indicate that, 
although the BRI is the PRC’s flagship initiative, and is being propelled with high levels 
of economic investment, it cannot produce favorable behavior changes on its own. In fact, 
it may create negative behavior towards the PRC.  
The second finding partially supports Hypothesis 1, as it reveals an increased 
alignment with the PRC. For example, in 2013 vote alignment with the PRC increased in 
the following countries when they received high amounts of BRI investment and Aid, 
Loans and Grants: Myanmar (+0.14), Cambodia (+0.12), and Indonesia (+0.09).154 
Furthermore, the second finding may suggest that the PRC increases BRI investment, and 
Aid, Loans and Grants, in countries where it seeks more favor for its interests.  
(2) HYPOTHESIS 2: High levels of economic partnerships between the 
PRC and Southeast Asian countries will be associated with favorable 
support for PRC interests. 
Similar to the previous two findings, the interactions between vote score, trade 
balance, and GDP were also found to be situational. The statistical analysis of this 
relationship finds that vote alignment with the PRC is higher in poorer countries when the 
trade balance is in the PRC’s favor; however, under the same condition in richer countries, 
alignment with the PRC decreases. Figure 7 displays these significant findings. 
 
154 Vote Alignment Scores from 2008–2018 by Country Are Located in Table 3 of the Appendix. . 
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Figure 7 is a visual depiction of the interaction of UNGA vote score, trade balance 
and GDP. Trade balance [independent variable] is shown on the x-axis (as the number 
increases, the trade balance increases in the PRC’s favor), and the vote score [dependent 
variable] is shown on the y-axis. GDP is shown as a range of colors with the highest level 
of GDP in green, the median level in blue and the lowest level in red. The third significant 
finding is shown by the slope of the red line increasing as the trade balance increases in the 
PRC’s favor. This indicates that as the trade balance shifts in the PRC’s favor, there is a 
stronger vote alignment between the PRC and countries with lower wealth. The fourth 
significant finding is shown as the slope of the green line decreases as the trade balance 
between richer countries and the PRC increases in the PRC’s favor. This demonstrates that 
in wealthier countries, there is a negative relationship between vote alignment and trade 
balances that increase in favor of the PRC. 
 
Figure 7. UNGA Vote Score by Trade Balance Displayed by Southeast 
Asian Countries’ GDP 
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The third finding partially supports Hypothesis 2, as alignment with the PRC 
increased as the trade balance shifted in the PRC’s favor. This may indicate that in less 
wealthy countries, economic relationships such as trade that largely support the domestic 
population, produce more alignment with the PRC. The fourth finding was in contradiction 
to Hypothesis 2 as demonstrated by wealthier countries’ alignment with the PRC 
decreasing as the trade balance increased in the PRC’s favor. This may indicate that the 
PRC has less influence over wealthier countries, as they may have the fortitude to not align 
with the PRC under certain conditions. 
(3) HYPOTHESIS 3: Southeast Asian Countries will attempt to balance 
the PRC’s influence when economic relationships are in the PRC’s 
favor. 
The research findings do not support Hypothesis 3. The interactions between vote 
alignment and economic investment are situational, yet still more characteristic of hedging 
than balancing. Despite the PRC’s expansive economic advantage, countries within the 
region increased economic partnerships with the PRC throughout the period of the 
investigation. The trade balance appears to have elicited the strongest behavioral change. 
However, even when wealthier countries decreased their vote alignment with the PRC, 
they continued to increase trade relationships that clearly gave the PRC an asymmetric 
economic advantage over them. Additionally, in a bandwagoning fashion, poorer countries 
increased their alignment with the PRC in concert with the expanding trade balance. To a 
lesser, but still significant, extent, alignment with the PRC increased when countries 
received high amounts of BRI investment, and aid, loans, and grants. However, high BRI 
investment produced a significant negative effect on vote alignment when not combined 
with high amounts of Aid, Loans and Grants. The next chapter will discuss the broader 
implications of the results of this research and recommendations for future research. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The significance of this research is that the perceived estimates of the PRC’s 
economic influence within Southeast Asia are conditional and may be overestimated. 
Although the nations within the region have increased their cooperation and economic ties 
with the PRC, they have primarily adopted a strategy of hedging. Countries within 
Southeast Asia are attempting to gain maximum benefits from multiple countries, without 
fully aligning with any specific country in order to maintain their autonomy and avoid 
being caught in a conflict with a stronger power. While Southeast Asian countries are 
continuing to economically collaborate with the PRC, this research suggest that the PRC 
converting its economic influence into measurable behavior changes is situational, and 
largely based on the wealth and financial stability of the country receiving support.  
Over the last several years, there has been a lot of speculation concerning the 
influence of the BRI that suggests it will elevate the status and influence of the PRC. In 
this study, the effect of BRI investment was shown to be dependent upon being combined 
with other forms of economic investment. There was specifically a negative correlation 
with increased BRI investment and low investment in Aid, Loans and Grants. This finding 
appears to be consistent with the trend of ASEAN countries reviewing the profitability and 
debt associated with BRI projects such as Malaysia’s renegotiation of the East Coast Rail 
Link, and the halt of a rail line project in Thailand due to concerns about loan interest 
rates.155 These factors suggest that some nations within the region are attempting to 
maximize their economic benefits from the PRC but cautiously trying to avoid a debt trap. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, when there was high investment in both the BRI and 
Aid, Loans and Grants, there was a strong alignment with the PRC. In this case, countries 
that were more financially dependent on the PRC consistently aligned with it. 
Surprisingly, FDI was not a significant factor when assessing the voting alignment 
of Southeast Asian nations with the PRC; however, as expected, trade balance was 
significant. The behavior of nations with smaller economies appear to be positively 
 
155 Shoji, “China’s Formation of the Regional Order,” 46. 
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influenced by the PRC the most when the trade balance is in the PRC’s favor. In contrast, 
in nations with larger economies, a negative relationship is shown when the trade balance 
is in the PRC’s favor. This interaction may indicate that countries with larger economies 
are better positioned to reap selective benefits of a trade relationship with the PRC without 
completely aligning their interests. In that context, it appears that these countries are 
displaying characteristics of hedging by cooperating when the PRC clearly has the 
advantage, and resisting PRC influence in other areas that are less consequential. In Kuik’s 
description of hedging, a country displaying concurrent behavior towards a stronger power 
that is “contradictory and counteracting” is potentially maintaining a safe position by 
having its opposing actions negate each other.156 Considering that all of the countries in 
Southeast Asia are in asymmetric relationships with the PRC, a middle position that 
maximizes their benefits, and provides avenues to mitigate risk may continue to be the 
most attractive strategy.  
The majority of countries in the region have chosen a strategy of hedging over 
balancing, even though Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia are engaged in territorial 
disputes with the PRC that have been characterized by revisionist and aggressive 
behavior.157 At present, this strategy appears to be necessary as the countries within the 
region are carefully attempting to balance a significant economic relationship that supports 
many of their domestic priorities. This is evident in the Asian Development Bank’s 
estimate that the Asia-Pacific region will need $1.7 trillion from 2016 to 2030 for 
infrastructure to support the growth in the region.158 Based on reasons such as this, it is 
unlikely that economic partnerships with the PRC will significantly decrease.159  
Despite the countries within the region having significant economic relationships 
with the PRC, the United States has largely been able to maintain influence over its vital 
security interests within Southeast Asia. In my opinion, Southeast Asian countries’ 
 
156 Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge?”505” 
157 Murphy, “Great Power Rivalries,” 174. 
158 Kong, “The Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia,” 38. 
159 Chan, “Singapore–China Connectivity,” 37. 
diversification of economic relationships with the PRC does not necessarily equate to a net 
loss for the United States. Based on this research, there are negative trends associated with 
the PRC’s economic investment that may influence countries within Southeast Asia to 
continue to form strong relationships with countries other than the PRC. A strong presence 
of multiple major powers within the region could reduce the PRC’s likelihood of reaching 
regional hegemony. Furthermore, the countries within Southeast Asia are fairly adept at 
managing relationships between multiple great powers, and the majority of them will avoid 
directly aligning with any one major power unless their national security is threatened. 
Pillsbury’s assertion that the PRC has a hundred-year plan may be correct; however, based 
on the analysis conducted in this study, the PRC’s plan appears to be flawed and may not 
produce the intended outcome. 
Due to previous inconsistencies, going forward the United States should 
demonstrate that it is a reliable security partner, and supportive of economic stability within 
the region. The United States does not have to be the largest economic partner to maintain 
the status quo regional order. However, as countries within the region determine which 
major powers to align with or defy on certain issues, the United States is a more attractive 
alternative to the PRC when it is a reliable security partner, and advocate for shared interest 
in multilateral institutions.  
As this research focused on the influence of economic investment on measurable 
behavior change in Southeast Asia, future research can identify if these same investments 
influence behavior changes in other regions. This will help determine if the effects of the 
PRC’s economic investment found in this research are applicable outside of Southeast 
Asia. Further research in this area may provide insight into trends of behavior that will 
further iluminate the influence of the PRC’s economic investment. 
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APPENDIX A.  PRC IMPORTS AND EXPORTS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA BY COUNTRY 
Trade Flow: Exports from PRC and Imports to PRC160 
Country Trade flow 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Exports 1,703,776,234 1,746,814,598 1,407,408,747 510,852,391 637,592,774 1,597,616,589
Imports 89,803,505 189,717,197 101,156,073 221,546,472 351,809,713 247,640,850
Exports 3,409,507,478 3,274,737,955 3,763,390,571 3,928,684,744 4,783,198,403 6,022,950,063
Imports 363,634,853 482,914,653 666,595,118 830,513,470 1,007,581,678 1,377,337,531
Exports 36,930,489,821 39,059,605,524 34,341,964,720 32,117,494,749 34,757,384,544 43,246,345,320
Imports 31,424,278,600 24,485,246,982 19,886,194,033 21,414,036,371 28,574,305,510 34,154,685,183
Exports 1,722,576,814 1,839,475,080 1,225,758,347 986,966,609 1,419,351,176 1,455,739,477
Imports 1,010,079,275 1,777,883,187 1,547,337,273 1,359,607,754 1,604,997,325 2,029,602,507
Exports 45,930,593,403 46,353,387,874 43,980,386,746 37,660,167,391 41,712,282,701 45,848,411,856
Imports 60,153,183,872 55,652,242,622 53,277,330,687 49,269,636,528 54,426,139,443 63,321,953,929
Exports 7,338,688,821 9,367,646,907 9,650,911,459 8,187,651,272 8,948,464,266 10,567,874,244
Imports 2,856,866,581 15,601,279,451 5,449,295,046 4,097,708,683 4,526,347,998 4,718,842,085
Exports 19,868,125,345 23,473,577,223 26,670,791,210 29,836,566,657 32,065,932,447 35,111,186,384
Imports 18,181,829,139 20,984,132,158 18,965,654,304 17,395,891,173 19,239,177,209 20,595,680,299
Exports 45,831,864,575 48,911,174,763 51,942,439,609 44,495,953,063 45,019,300,478 49,817,841,244
Imports 30,064,514,713 30,828,733,314 27,580,763,340 26,014,248,910 34,249,623,689 33,638,315,735
Exports 32,717,903,843 34,289,227,963 38,290,804,015 37,182,731,174 38,541,726,588 42,974,255,961
Imports 38,522,680,528 38,331,928,398 37,168,745,238 38,532,342,814 41,596,082,905 44,918,670,224
Exports 47,386,367 60,341,649 104,529,645 164,272,800 132,596,622 132,781,191
Imports 397,037 99,850 724,858 291,606 1,573,168 3,014,403
Exports 48,586,298,201 63,730,014,143 66,017,019,778 61,094,096,781 71,617,248,156 84,015,798,650













160 Source: “China, Imports and Exports, All Commodities,” TrendEconomy, November 15, 2020, https://trendeconomy.com/query/
0ccdd5149db94ef990045ec170803843. 
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APPENDIX B.  SOUTHEAST ASIA VOTE SCORE ALIGNMENT WITH PRC BY COUNTRY 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Myanmar 0.8081 0.7857 0.8636 0.6263 0.6957 0.8361 0.8375 0.7821 0.5965 0.5504 0.5684 
Thailand 0.7576 0.8690 0.8523 0.8283 0.7717 0.8361 0.8125 0.7564 0.7018 0.6977 0.7474 
Cambodia 0.7677 0.6786 0.8523 0.7576 0.7609 0.8852 0.8125 0.7949 0.7193 0.7054 0.8316 
Laos 0.7374 0.8333 0.8068 0.7172 0.8152 0.8033 0.8125 0.7564 0.6491 0.6977 0.7895 
Vietnam 0.7576 0.8095 0.8523 0.7475 0.7935 0.8361 0.8250 0.7692 0.5877 0.7054 0.8105 
Malaysia 0.8384 0.9048 0.9318 0.7980 0.7935 0.8525 0.8500 0.7692 0.7281 0.6667 0.7789 
Singapore 0.7879 0.8690 0.8750 0.8586 0.7717 0.8852 0.8250 0.7692 0.7193 0.7209 0.7684 
Brunei 0.8384 0.8929 0.9205 0.8485 0.8152 0.8852 0.8625 0.7821 0.7456 0.7209 0.8000 
Philippines 0.7576 0.8571 0.8182 0.7980 0.7609 0.8689 0.7750 0.7692 0.7193 0.7132 0.7579 
Indonesia 0.8586 0.8929 0.9205 0.7980 0.7717 0.8689 0.8500 0.7692 0.6667 0.6822 0.8105 
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APPENDIX C.  PRC TRADE BALANCE WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA BY 
COUNTRY FOR 2018 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos161 
 
161 Adapted from “China, Imports and Exports, All Commodities.” 
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162 Adapted from “China, Imports and Exports, All Commodities.” 
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Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam163 
 
 
163 Adapted from “China, Imports and Exports, All Commodities.” 
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